A randomly-generated password can be a lot shorter than an equivalent-strength passphrase, actually:
If you have a dictionary with 25,000 words in it, and you randomly select 5 of them, your passphrase will have a strength of about 73 bits of entropy, which is decent (but actually less than the NIST recommendation of 80 bits, as it happens; to get there, you’d need 6 words).
A similar-strength randomly-generated password consisting of letters (upper- and lower-case), numbers, and a selection of 10 possible symbol characters (so, a total spread of 26 + 26 + 10 + 10 = 72 possible characters) would only need to be 12 characters long (and would have a strength of about 74 bits of entropy–13 characters would top 80 bits).
The passphrase would take over 300 years to brute-force at 1 trillion guesses per second, but the extra bit of entropy in the 12-character password means it would take 600 years to guess that one at the same rate.
I use randomly generated passphrases that do use symbols and integers. It’s easier to type if I’m copying it from my manager manually. I really dislike the focus some services have on maximum length.
My argument would be that 300 years vs 600 years is meaningless when the human lifespan is so much shorter. At that point, who gives a shit? I’ll personally take a passphrase I can easily remember over doubling the already insanely long amount of time it would take to brute force the phrase.
Most people pick bad passwords because it’s easier to remember. Why not encourage them to use something that is both easy to remember AND more secure than the original?
The other aspect is the actual hashing algorithm used for storing and validating the input. Using a system that allows for artificially inflating the amount of time required (bcrypt rounds for example) makes it easier to mitigate a brute force attack. If the service is using an algorithm that is ready “broken” then it really doesn’t matter what you used as the input.
The goal is not to reach the most secure system, rather to increase overall security by getting as many people to use things that are better than before while balancing usability. There’s a reason not everyone uses 2FA, or has physical devices for it.
Well, I used 1 trillion guesses a second here. 10 years ago I’d have used 10 billion. So length does matter. And 300 years drops to 1 year if a dedicated attacker is willing to spend a good bit more on hardware (which, in the era of cryptocurrency, could actually be worth it, even just for a criminal).
And yes, sites should use good hashing algorithms, but we users can’t count on them doing so. Plus, even a technically-but-not-practically broken hashing algorithm isn’t so broken as to be equivalent to plaintext storage (unless it’s unsalted), so it’s less about specific algorithm choices and more about overall design security.
Not saying passphrases are useless, but password managers are the better technological path, in my opinion, because they obviate the need to remember more than just one password, and allow to you skip typing in passwords too (in fact, a pw manager is better for passphrase users, because they they can still use memorable phrases but don’t have to type them in all the time).
And as it happens, my master password for my pw manager was originally a 6-word passphrase, but has since been changed to a 20-character randomly-generated password, because it’s a ton easier to type, particularly on mobile.
Absolutely agree on the usage of a password manager. And yes, as hardware increases in power we run into the issue of timelines being shorter. I disagree on MD5 being not totally broken, considering a collision can be found in seconds on even low end hardware these days. Even salted, a collision would still be viable.
Again, the real problem overall is adoption. Getting people to use better passwords/phrases that are less likely to be brute forced. Everyone should be using non-SMS 2FA, ideally with an authenticator app or physical key. As well, password length should only be limited by a minimum value rather than being in a small range. Services should be using algorithms that are recent, well audited, and have the ability to artificially inflate the time taken to get the result for future-proofing. SSO is also an option, since services without IT departments or people with the ability to handle passwords should offload it to a service that can. SSO as a service provider is very appealing, as you no longer have the responsibility of storing sensitive hashes and account information.
Was not aware of the latest efforts on MD5, in all honesty; I take back what I said before.
I agree with everything you said there 100% except the bit about SSO. SSO is great for people working in managed environments (I wish my workplace would make broader use of it, honestly), but expanding it to everyone as a whole creates some serious issues (putting everyone’s eggs in the same basket is a security risk, and worse, having a centralized third party notified of every login request totally undermines user privacy).
I don’t mean to imply that it should be everywhere, rather it is appealing as an option when the only other option is to roll your own setup.
It’s useful for connected services, orgs, etc. Especially when it comes to easily setting up access controls. But you’re right, it’s not a solution that should be used everywhere due to the fact that a single point of failure is bad.
Btw this has been a great discussion and I hope that others reading this might help further the goal of creating a safer internet
A randomly-generated password can be a lot shorter than an equivalent-strength passphrase, actually:
If you have a dictionary with 25,000 words in it, and you randomly select 5 of them, your passphrase will have a strength of about 73 bits of entropy, which is decent (but actually less than the NIST recommendation of 80 bits, as it happens; to get there, you’d need 6 words).
A similar-strength randomly-generated password consisting of letters (upper- and lower-case), numbers, and a selection of 10 possible symbol characters (so, a total spread of 26 + 26 + 10 + 10 = 72 possible characters) would only need to be 12 characters long (and would have a strength of about 74 bits of entropy–13 characters would top 80 bits).
The passphrase would take over 300 years to brute-force at 1 trillion guesses per second, but the extra bit of entropy in the 12-character password means it would take 600 years to guess that one at the same rate.
I use randomly generated passphrases that do use symbols and integers. It’s easier to type if I’m copying it from my manager manually. I really dislike the focus some services have on maximum length.
My argument would be that 300 years vs 600 years is meaningless when the human lifespan is so much shorter. At that point, who gives a shit? I’ll personally take a passphrase I can easily remember over doubling the already insanely long amount of time it would take to brute force the phrase.
Most people pick bad passwords because it’s easier to remember. Why not encourage them to use something that is both easy to remember AND more secure than the original?
The other aspect is the actual hashing algorithm used for storing and validating the input. Using a system that allows for artificially inflating the amount of time required (bcrypt rounds for example) makes it easier to mitigate a brute force attack. If the service is using an algorithm that is ready “broken” then it really doesn’t matter what you used as the input.
The goal is not to reach the most secure system, rather to increase overall security by getting as many people to use things that are better than before while balancing usability. There’s a reason not everyone uses 2FA, or has physical devices for it.
Well, I used 1 trillion guesses a second here. 10 years ago I’d have used 10 billion. So length does matter. And 300 years drops to 1 year if a dedicated attacker is willing to spend a good bit more on hardware (which, in the era of cryptocurrency, could actually be worth it, even just for a criminal).
And yes, sites should use good hashing algorithms, but we users can’t count on them doing so. Plus, even a technically-but-not-practically broken hashing algorithm isn’t so broken as to be equivalent to plaintext storage (unless it’s unsalted), so it’s less about specific algorithm choices and more about overall design security.
Not saying passphrases are useless, but password managers are the better technological path, in my opinion, because they obviate the need to remember more than just one password, and allow to you skip typing in passwords too (in fact, a pw manager is better for passphrase users, because they they can still use memorable phrases but don’t have to type them in all the time).
And as it happens, my master password for my pw manager was originally a 6-word passphrase, but has since been changed to a 20-character randomly-generated password, because it’s a ton easier to type, particularly on mobile.
Absolutely agree on the usage of a password manager. And yes, as hardware increases in power we run into the issue of timelines being shorter. I disagree on MD5 being not totally broken, considering a collision can be found in seconds on even low end hardware these days. Even salted, a collision would still be viable.
Again, the real problem overall is adoption. Getting people to use better passwords/phrases that are less likely to be brute forced. Everyone should be using non-SMS 2FA, ideally with an authenticator app or physical key. As well, password length should only be limited by a minimum value rather than being in a small range. Services should be using algorithms that are recent, well audited, and have the ability to artificially inflate the time taken to get the result for future-proofing. SSO is also an option, since services without IT departments or people with the ability to handle passwords should offload it to a service that can. SSO as a service provider is very appealing, as you no longer have the responsibility of storing sensitive hashes and account information.
Was not aware of the latest efforts on MD5, in all honesty; I take back what I said before.
I agree with everything you said there 100% except the bit about SSO. SSO is great for people working in managed environments (I wish my workplace would make broader use of it, honestly), but expanding it to everyone as a whole creates some serious issues (putting everyone’s eggs in the same basket is a security risk, and worse, having a centralized third party notified of every login request totally undermines user privacy).
I don’t mean to imply that it should be everywhere, rather it is appealing as an option when the only other option is to roll your own setup.
It’s useful for connected services, orgs, etc. Especially when it comes to easily setting up access controls. But you’re right, it’s not a solution that should be used everywhere due to the fact that a single point of failure is bad.
Btw this has been a great discussion and I hope that others reading this might help further the goal of creating a safer internet