• chaogomu@kbin.social
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    1 year ago

    If regulatory sabotage isn’t real, what do you call the prohibition against multiplexing? Or the requirement for a contingency plan for a Double-Ended-Guillotine-Break of the primary loop piping? That second one cannot actually be simulated in reality because steel doesn’t break like that. And yet, it’s one of the most expensive design requirements that nuclear power plants must comply with. It also comes at the expense of safety standards that would actually work, because you cannot design for reality and this fiction on the same page.

    Then there are stories like this one

    A forklift at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory moved a small spent fuel cask from the storage pool to the hot cell. The cask had not been properly drained and some pool water was dribbled onto the blacktop along the way. Despite the fact that some characters had taken a midnight swim in such a pool in the days when I used to visit there and were none the worse for it, storage pool water is defined as a hazardous contaminant. It was deemed necessary therefore to dig up the entire path of the forklift, creating a trench two feet wide by a half mile long that was dubbed Toomer’s Creek, after the unfortunate worker whose job it was to ensure that the cask was fully drained.

    The Bannock Paving Company was hired to repave the entire road. Bannock used slag from the local phosphate plants as aggregate in the blacktop, which had proved to be highly satisfactory in many of the roads in the Pocatello, Idaho area. After the job was complete, it was learned that the aggregate was naturally high in thorium, and was more radioactive that the material that had been dug up, marked with the dreaded radiation symbol, and hauled away for expensive, long-term burial.

    Another type of sabotage is called “backfitting”;

    The new rules would be imposed on plants already under construction. A 1974 study by the General Accountability Office of the Sequoyah plant documented 23 changes “where a structure or component had to be torn out and rebuilt or added because of required changes.” The Sequoyah plant began construction in 1968, with a scheduled completion date of 1973 at a cost of $300 million. It actually went into operation in 1981 and cost $1700 million. This was a typical experience.

    And one final bit of regulatory sabotage, but one that I think was accidental, every nuclear plant has the exact same annual licensing fees regardless of power capacity. This means that there’s an incentive to build the largest, most complex plant possible, because you can put out more power for the same regulatory fee. The problem lies in the trap of thinking bigger and bigger, you suddenly have a reactor with parts that need special infrastructure to produce those parts, which is expensive, then you need special equipment to transport them, which is expensive, and special equipment to install them, which is expensive. And then, when the plant is built, it has way more capacity than is actually needed by the surrounding communities.